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LEGISLATION
A New Proposal for a Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act
Early efforts to draft a uniform mortgage act were abandoned because of the
apparent impossibility of drawing a semblance of order out of the complications
and differences of form and procedure in the various states.' However, in 1927
I. See 36 A. B. A. REv. (i9,1) 95o; I92o HANDBOOK OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws i65.
(517)
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the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws succeeded in drafting an act which
was approved by the American Bar Association.2 Despite other influential en-
dorsement," no state has adopted the 1927 proposal. 4 The new act was instigated
by the experiences of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Federal Housing
Administration and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in conducting fore-
closures under a variety of state laws.5 While primarily based on the 1927 pro-
posal, it has incorporated provisions which, it is hoped, will avoid many bitter
depression experiences in mortgage lending and foreclosures. The present draft
is not final 1 but it is expected that the final draft will be presented to the Ameri-
can Bar Association for approval at its 1938 meeting.'
The provisions of the act are prospective only, but the mortgagor and mort-
gagee may agree, in a recorded writing, that they shall apply to prior mortgages.8
Constitutional questions based on impairment of contract obligations are thereby
avoided.9 Section 2 defines words and phrases used in the act and section 22
expounds the meanings of covenants in a recommended statutory mortgage.10
The power of a legislature to define its own language and thereby bind the courts
is well established, and, for the sake of clarity, desirable."1
Lien or Title
Of particular interest is the definition of the term "mortgage". 12 Although
the majority of states in this country have adopted the lien theory of mortgages, 18
a considerable number still purport, at least, to follow the common law or title
theory.'4 The law in the various states is confused and irregular so that writers
fail to agree on classifications of states as either lien or title.' 5 However, the basic
difference between the two views is that under the lien theory the mortgagee is
not entitled to possession 16 and usually not to rents and profits 17 of the mortgaged
premises until foreclosure, while under the modern common law theory the mort-
gagee is entitled to possession and rents and profits on the mortgagor's default
with respect to any condition of the mortgage.'"
The 1927 proposal expressly adopted the lien theory 19 and stipulated that
the mortgagor should have no right to possession or to rents and profits until
2. 52 A. B. A. REP. (1927) 402.
3. See Pomeroy, The Uniform Mortgage Act (1926) 34 J. POL. ECON. 383, 386. See
also MAcCHESNEY, REAL ESTATE LAW (1927) §491; Legis. (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 861,
(1925) 38 HAiRv. L. REv. 651, (1926) 15 Ky. L. J. 22, (1930) 17 VA. L. RE v. 179.
4. Only § 36, providing for a uniform short form mortgage, has been enacted in Minne-
sota. MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 8204-9.
5. The chairman of the committee drafting the act is Horace Russell, general counsel
to the Home Loan Bank Board.
6. Draft of August 31, 1937.
7. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 21, 1937, p. 2, col. 6.
8. § Io.
9. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § IO.
10. §:21.
II. See Legis. (937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 189, 195.
12. §2 (d).
13. E. g., FLA. GEN. LAWS (1927) § 5725; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9572. See
WA.LSH, MORTGAGES (934) § 5; I JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 67.
14. Mallory v. Agee, 226 Ala. 596, 147 So. 881 (1932) ; Cook v. Curtis, 125 Me. 114, 131
AtI. 204 (1925). See WALsH, MORTGAGES (1934) § 5; 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§ 67.
15. Compare WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 27 with I JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§ 67. An intermediate view exists in Delaware, Mississippi and Missouri. Ibid.
16. See MAcCHEsNEY, REAL ESTATE LAW (1927) §§ 342, 343.
17. The right to rents and profits apparently depends on possession. See 2 JONES, MORT-
GAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 827.
I8. Supra notes 16 and 17.
19. 1927 proposal, § 2 (I).
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foreclosure and expiration of the redemption period.20 However, the act has been
criticized 21 because of other provisions inconsistent with the lien theory. The
chief inconsistency was the provision that tender of the amount due on a mort-
gage when made after maturity, if not accepted, did not of itself discharge the lien
of the mortgage. 22 The prevailing view, under the lien theory, is that a mortgage
continues to be a lien even after default, and therefore the mortgagee is bound to
accept valid tender of the debt made after default the same as on the due day, and
if he rejects the tender he loses his lien.23 A lesser inconsistency was the pro-
vision for appointment of a receiver, where necessary, to prevent loss of security.24
The lien theory states are evidently not agreed on this policy,25 although some
allow it by statute.
26
The new act adopts neither view. Section 2 (d) defines a mortgage as any
"instrument whereby a lien is created upon real estate . . . or whereby title to
real estate is conveyed to another person." Section 4o (a) provides that the
mortgagee gets no right to possession or rents and profits of the mortgaged prem-
ises except as provided by the mortgage. The exceptions referred to are section
22 (5) which enumerates certain contingencies in which the mortgagee shall have
a right to possession, and section 22 (9) which provides that on the breach of any
covenant of the mortgage, the mortgagee shall have a right to collect and receive
on behalf of the mortgagor all the rents and profits. Although both these sections
violate the lien theory, they deal with interpretations of covenants in a statutory
mortgage recommended, 27 and under section i I may either be added to or entirely
omitted. In view of the flexibility provided, no objections should be raised in
lien jurisdictions.
The new act makes no mention of the effect of tender after maturity of the
obligation and, therefore, questions concerned therewith are to be determined,
under section 61, by the law of the particular state, while section 40 (b) allows
the court to appoint a receiver of mortgaged premises for the benefit of any mort-
gagee entitled thereto. Objections raised to positive provisions of the old act
regarding these questions are thus avoided. Moreover, the diverse interests of
mortgagor and mortgagee are adequately handled. Sections 22 (5) and 22 (9)
furnish attractions and security to lenders, while section 40 affords adequate
protection to the mortgagor.
A Statutory Form of Mortgage
In Article III, simplification of mortgage forms is sought. Section 21 sug-
gests a statutory form of mortgage which contains ten covenants by which, in
addition to warranting title, the mortgagor promises to pay both the obligation
secured and the taxes, to keep buildings insured, to avoid waste and to keep the
premises in repair, to defend the mortgage, to pay prior mortgages or other liens,
20. Id., § 2 (2).
2. See Legis. (1930) 17 VA. L. REv. 179, 1I.
22. 1927 proposal, § 5.
23. Davies v. Dow, So Minn. 223, 83 N. W. 50 (igoo) ; Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 243
(i86O), modified by Tuthill v. Wheeler, 81 N. Y. 94 (i88o) which requires the mortgagor
to give sufficient time to the mortgagee to ascertain the amount due; cf. Knollenberger v.
Nixon, 171 Mo. 445, 72 S. W. 41 (1902). Contra: Himmelmann v. Fitzpatrick, 5o Cal. 65o
(1875) (tender after the due date does not discharge the lien). See Legis. (1930) 17 VA. L.
REv. 179, IS.
24. 1927 proposal, §§ 4 (I), (2).
25. Compare Interstate Bus. Men's Ass'n v. Nicho's Estate, 213 Iowa 12, 238 N. W.
435 (1931) and Nielsen v. Heald, 151 Minn. 181, 186 N. W. 299 (1922) with Olson v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., 6o N. D. 671, 235 N. W. 722 (931) and State ex rel. Allen v.
Superior Ct. for King County, 164 Wash. 515, 2 P. (2d) 1095 (1931).
26. IDAH o CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 6, § 6ol.
27. § 2.
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and to assign rents and profits of the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee. It is
also provided that the mortgagee may advance up to the maximum amount fixed
in the mortgage on the security of the mortgage, and on breach of any covenant
in the mortgage, shall have the statutory right of sale. The costs of foreclosure
are to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. As drafted, the statutory mortgage
is extremely favorable to the mortgagee.2 8 However, this advantage is tempered
and desirable flexibility is provided inasmuch as any of these covenants may be
omitted or other clauses added, which are to be designated as "non-statutory".
29
Moreover, the use of other lawful forms of mortgage instruments is not pro-
hibited.80 Many advantages may be had by the use of the type of mortgage
provided by the act. The length of the ordinary mortgage deed is reduced with
resultant savings in both labor and recordation expenses."- Furthermore, the
covenants are more intelligible to the layman and their statutory exposition 8 2 will
do much to eliminate the uncertainties of judicial construction. The 1927 proposal,
in addition to a uniform short form mortgage, 83 provided a similar uniform short
form trust mortgage. 4 The statutory mortgage may easily be converted into a
deed of trust form 35 and used under the act inasmuch as the term "mortgage" is
defined by the act to include deeds of trust. 6
Foreclosure by Power of Sale
The main provisions of the act are contained in Article IV. By the power
of sale, it is aimed to provide a cheap and quick method of foreclosure, with an
absolute clarification of title 7 and, at the same time, to protect mortgagors from
unconscionable exercises of the power of sale and excessive deficiency judgments.3 8
Except in a few states where the exercise of the power is expressly forbidden
by statute,33 foreclosure by power of sale in a mortgage is recognized as valid '
and the procedure is regulated in varying detail.4 ' Where allowed, however, the
power of sale is optional with the mortgagee 4 2 and does not exclude other methods
of foreclosure.43 Recognizing this, section 12 stipulates that a power of sale in a
mortgage must be exercised by the procedure prescribed by the act, but, by appro-
priate court action, any mortgage may be foreclosed by the mortgagee at his
option.
28. See § 22.
29. § II.
30. Ibid.
31. See Roberts, Uniform Mortgage Act (1927) 15 Ky. L. J. 22, 28; MAcCHESNY,
REAL ESTATE LAW (1927) § 333.
32. Supra note 28.
33. 1927 proposal, § 36.
34. Id., § 36a.
35. Under a deed of trust, conveyance is made to a trustee who holds legal title until the
mortgage debt is paid. The form is usually used to secure an issue of corporate bonds, or
in cases where a mortgage is made, to secure debts owing to a number of creditors. See
WA.LSH, MORTGAGES (1934) § 13.
36. § 2 (d).
37. For an analysis of the advantages of foreclosure by power of sale, see Legis. (1925)
38 HARv. L. REv. 6si, 658.
38. The objections to unrestricted exercise of the power of sale are discussed in Mac-
Chesney and Leesman, Mortgages, Foreclosures and Reorganization (1936) 31 ILL. L. REv.
287, 289.
39. E. g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 2322; ILL. Rrv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933)
c. 95, § 24; IOWA CODE (1931) § 12372; ORE. CODE ANN. (193o) § 6-5oi.
4o. Blackshear v. First Nat. Bank, 261 Fed. 6oi (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) ; Roberge v. Cyr,
84 N. H. 204, I47 AtI. 9O1 (1929).
41. E. g., MICH. Comp. LAWS (1929) 9§ 14425 et seq.; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§§ 9602 to 9631 ; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 51, §9 54o et seq.
42. See Lang v. Stansel, Io6 Ala. 389, 396, 17 So. 519, 521 (1895).
43. Dupee v. Rose, io Utah 305, 37 Pac. 567 (1894).
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A mortgagee or his agent 44 may foreclose a mortgage in the manner provided
by the act, if (i) any covenant of the mortgage has been breached, (2) the mort-
gage contains a power of sale and is recorded together with all assignments
thereof, and (3) no action at law or equity is pending to secure a judgment on
any part of the obligation secured by the mortgage.4 5 Proceedings are instituted
by recording,46 and publishing 47 notice of the sale 48 9o days before its date.. It
is required that at least 6o days prior to the sale all interested persons be given
notice49 by registered mail.50 However, failure to give such notice will not
invalidate the foreclosure sale."" The latter provision evidently has been inserted
to avoid jeopardizing title procured through foreclosure. In view of the short
period of redemption, 2 failure to mail a notice may result practically in a for-
feiture of interest. Of course, there is a published notice but its chances of
attracting the attention of interested parties are slight. However, assurance of
good title at foreclosure not only will induce mortgage loans at a greater percent-
age of property value, but also should stimulate higher bidding at foreclosure
sales, so that the advantages of the last mentioned provision would appear to
outweigh its disadvantages.
The sale is made by the sheriff and any person having an interest in the
mortgaged premises may bid.58 Should the premises consist of more than one
parcel, they must be offered, first, in parcels, then as an entirety, and sold finally
according to the method returning the highest gross price.5 4 The manner of
selling premises in most states is prescribed by statutes.5 The one provided in
the present proposal is similar to that used in Mississippi 11 and is preferable since
it results in getting the highest possible price for the property.
The sale is not complete until the sheriff has collected the purchase price.17
The proceeds are then applied, first, to payment of statutory costs and attorneys'
fees,58 secondly, to the mortgage debt and finally the balance, if any, is paid over
to the mortgagor.5 9
Court Review of Foreclosure Under Power of Sale
In order to bring foreclosure under a power of sale within the surveillance of
the court, thus avoiding objections that have been raised against an unrestricted
power of sale, 0 actions to enjoin a proposed foreclosure 61 and to rescind a com-
pleted sale 62 are allowed those having an interest in the mortgaged premises or
in the obligation secured by the mortgage, while the mortgagee or the purchaser
is given the right to an action to confirm a completed sale6 5
44. §45.
45. §§ 30 and 3oa.
46. §31a (I).
47. § 31a (2).
48. § 3I (provides a statutory form of notice).
49. § 31a (3).
50. §43.
51. § 3Ia (3).
52. § 35 (redemption period of 3o days after foreclosure sale).
53. § 33a.
§31b and c provide methods for postponing the foreclosure sale. Postponements are
within the control of the sheriff and mortgagee.
54. § 33b.
55. WALS11, MORTGAGES (1934) § 75, n. z. See MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9636.
56. Miss. CoxsT. § III. See ETHIDGE, MIssIssn'PI CoNsTrruTIONs (1928) 225.
57. § 33c.
58. § 38 (stipulates costs and attorneys' fees to be allowed).
59. § 33c.
6o. See Legis. (1925) 38 HAzy. L. Rav. 651, 658.
61. § 32.
62. §34.
63. § 35a.
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A petition to enjoin a foreclosure sale may be presented at any time after
notice of and before the date set for the sale and the facts which must be set forth
in such a petition are specified in the act.64 Although the right to such an action
is necessary for the protection of the mortgagor, its utility may be negatived, in
many cases, by the requirement that the petitioner pay into court $250 or a sum
equivalent to one-tenth of the unpaid balance of the obligation.65 Obviously, this
provision was inserted in the act to discourage the bringing of such actions on
slight pretense. It seems, however, that the usual cost of court proceedings would
sufficiently deter the use of the privilege to avoid its abuse. In the 1927 proposal,
not even a bond was required of the petitioner; 66 in order to effectuate the purpose
of allowing an action to enjoin, in this respect, the new act might have followed
the old to better advantage.
An action to rescind a foreclosure sale must be brought within 30 days after
the sale and must be based on specific violations of the act at or after the fore-
closure sale.6 7  This section of the act is clearly superior to the corresponding
sections of the 1927 proposal. In the old proposal the period of limitation on
an action to set aside was from three to five years.68  By thus limiting the period
in which an action may be brought, the new act avoids the disadvantages to
mortgagor and mortgagee alike of an insecure foreclosure title, and at the same
time offers the mortgagor and diligent lienors sufficient time in which to take
advantage of the privilege.
The mortgagee or purchaser may petition for confirmation of the foreclosure
sale within 30 days after its date.69 While conceivably it might be advantageous
for the mortgagee or purchaser to establish the validity of the sale, it is improbable
that the action would be widely used since the sale becomes final within 30 days
if no action to rescind it is brought by the mortgagor"
Redemption
Section 35e allows a statutory period of redemption to the mortgagor of 30
days and on tender to the sheriff of the foreclosure sale price the mortgagor
becomes entitled to the interest of the purchaser.7 1 Although originally a mort-
gagor's equity of redemption was barred by foreclosure,7 2 more than one-third of
the states have enacted statutes creating a right to redeem after the foreclosure
sale, the usual period being one year.7 3 Recognizing the trend, the 1927 proposal
suggested a redemption period of one year.7 4  Moreover, the movement to aid the
mortgagor by allowing statutory redemption periods has gained impetus during
64. § 32.
65. Ibid.
66. 1927 proposal, § 33.
67. §34.
68. 1927 proposal, § 3o.
69. § 35a.
70. If either the action to enjoin or the action to set aside are successful, the mortgagee
does not lose his right of sale. "Any attempted exercise of the right of sale shall not exhaust
it until the title to the mortgaged property has effectively passed as a result of such fore-
closure sale." § 3oa.
71. The effect of redemption under the earlier proposal was to annul the sale and leave
the premises subject to all the liens that would have existed if no sale had been made, except
the lien of the foreclosed mortgage which was discharged by the sale. 1927 proposal, § 27.
But see Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption From Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform Mort-
gage Act (1925) 23 MICH. L. REv. 825, in which this was severely criticized and the so-called
Iowa rule, giving the redemptioner the title of the purchaser, was advanced. The Iowa rule
has been enacted into the present proposal in the sections indicated.
72. Eiceman v. Finch, 79 Ind. 511 (1881).
73. SuRVEy OF FORECLOSURE OPERATIONS (H. 0. L. C. 1937).
74. 1927 proposal, § 24 (i). See 1929 HANDBooK OF Com-M'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
69o, where it is indicated that the redemption period was not intended to be uniform.
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the depression.75 However, such statutes materially impair the mortgagee's secu-
rity since outside purchasers will not bid freely for property, the title to which is
subject to redemption for a long period of time and, as a consequence, the tendency
is to encourage the mortgagee's bidding in the property at a nominal amount.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether a longer period of redemption is of any advan-
tage to the mortgagor. Borrowing on the security of his property may become
more difficult and expensive. Furthermore, a recent study indicates that this
right is seldom utilized even in cases where substantial periods of redemption are
allowed. 76 Under the provisions of the new act, the one month redemption period
after sale, in addition to the necessary notice three months prior to the sale,77 gives
the mortgagor 12o days in which to redeem. As has been indicated, a longer
period would be disadvantageous to both mortgagor and mortgagee.
Section 37 provides a form for a statutory certificate of sale. The sheriff
cannot issue the certificate of sale to the purchaser until the 3o day redemption
period has run and if actions either to confirm or rescind the sale have been
brought, then not until the validity of the sale has been determined. On delivery,
the certificate of sale vests complete title in the purchaser, subject to prior encum-
brances or liens.78  Under the old act the certificate of sale, as evidence of good
title, meant little.7 9 The new act thus remedies the defects of the old by assuring
the purchaser of a dearer title at an earlier date.
Deficiency Judgments
Section 36 governs deficiency judgments. It provides methods whereby an
action for a deficiency judgment may be combined or included by intervention
with a petition for confirmation of a foreclosure sale or entered by a cross-bill in
an action by the mortgagor to rescind a foreclosure sale. The purpose of these
provisions is to speed up litigation.
The remaining provisions of the section are a direct outgrowth of depression
experiences.8 0 With the depression has come a scarcity of available funds, result-
ing in defaults and a cataclysmic increase in foreclosures81 Moreover, the col-
lapse of the real estate market has forced mortgagees generally to bid in the
property at foreclosure sales,8 2 usually without competition and at their own
prices. As a consequence, mortgagors, in addition to losing their land, have
become saddled with deficiency judgments approximating the original debts.
83
The apparent injustice of the situation not only has resulted in deficiency judg-
ment acts, 4 but some equity courts have exercised their discretionary powers in
75. E. g., Iowa Laws 1933, c. 179; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 157, § I; Vt. Laws 1933, no. 30,
§3; Wis. Laws 1933, c. II.
76. Statistics of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation show that out of 22,0o proper-
ties foreclosed, only 204 were redeemed despite the substantial periods of redemption permit-
ted in most of the cases. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 21, 1937, p. 2, col. 6.
77. § 3Ia.
78. Seven days after recordation of the certificate of sale the mortgagor shall be deemed
a trespasser and may be ejected by an appropriate action. § 37e.
79. 1927 proposal, § 18. See Legis. (1925) 38 HARV. L. Rzv. 65i, 656. § 30 of the
1927 proposal allowed from three to five years in which to bring an action to rescind the sale.
The efficacy of the certificate of sale, as evidence of good title, therefore was diminished. In
the new proposal, the certificate of sale cannot be issued until the mortgagor's right of action
has expired.
8o. The old proposal had no provision concerning deficiency judgments.
8. See Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1236.
82. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 16, 1937, p. 6, col. 4.
83. See Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 299.
84. E. g., Tex. Gen. Laws 1933, C. 92, declared unconstitutional in Langever v. Miller,
124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025 (1934). PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit 21,
§§ 808-82o, declared unconstitutional in Shallcross v. North Branch-Sedgwick B. & L. Ass'n,
x23 Pa. Super. 593, 187 Atl. 819 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 321 (1937). Wis. Laws 1933,
C. 125, declared unconstitutional in Hanauer v. Republic Bldg. Co., 216 Wis. 49, 255 N. W.
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an effort to protect the mortgagor. 85 However, attempts by legislatures to solve
the problem have been declared unconstitutional almost without exception," while
the majority of equity courts quite uniformly have held that mere inadequacy of
price is immaterial in the absence of mistake, misconduct or fraud.87
The act provides that where the obligor appears and answers, and a deficiency
judgment is entered, the amount of the deficiency shall be the difference between
the fair market value of the premises at the time of the foreclosure sale and the
sum of the unpaid balance of the obligation-fair market value to be determined
by the court or, on agreement of the parties, by a majority vote of three ap-
praisers.8 8 As a measure to prevent the recurrence of the existing undesirable
situation which finds between one and two million people facing possible deficiency
judgments should they ever reestablish themselves financially, the provision is not
only commendable but necessary.'
It is further provided that no action to obtain a deficiency judgment may be
brought later than six months after the date of the foreclosure sale.90 It is difficult
to see how this provision will have any ameliorating influence inasmuch as, except
in isolated instances, its only probable effect will be to stimulate the recording of
such judgments within the stipulated period. Some commentators have suggested
the complete abolition of deficiency judgments as a method to avoid the worst
results of the present system.9 ' Several states bar a subsequent action on the
debt by provisions that only one action can be had to enforce a debt secured by a
mortgage.92 However, it would have been poor diplomacy had the act adopted
such an extreme view inasmuch as mortgagee interests would probably be irrecon-
cilably opposed to such a provision.
Limitations on Foreclosure
Section 50 limits the period within which foreclosure proceedings may be
resorted to. The existing state law on the point is confused. In some jurisdic-
tions, periods of limitation are fixed by statute.9 s In others, it is held that
foreclosure will be denied where the original debt is barred by the statute of
limitations. 94 Where there is an unfair delay, the proceedings may be barred by
laches.9 5
The act provides that where the maturity of an obligation is ascertainable, the
period of limitations is ten years after maturity and where the date of the maturity
is unascertainable, it is fifty years from the date of the mortgage.
9 6 By a pre-
scribed procedure, the mortgagee may extend the period of limitations for ten
136 (I934). N. Y. CIv. PRAc. CODE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § io83, held constitutional in
Klinke v. Samuel, 264 N. Y. I44, i9o N. E. 324 (1934).
85. Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 281, 246 N. W. 556 (1933), 81 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 883; Federal Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 1I3 N. J. Eq. 200, 166
At. 538 (933). For a discussion of the point, see Note (I937) 24 VA. L. REv. 44-
86. Supra note 84.
87. First Nat. Bank v. Cahill, i6o Atl. 649 (N. J. Ch. 1932); Roberson v. Matthews,
2oo N. C. 241, i56 S. E. 496 (931) ; cf. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 107
S. W. (2d) 1035 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
88. §§ 36b and c.
89. See Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 21, 1937, p. 6, col. 4.
go. § 36a.
91. See MacChesney & Leesman, The Mortgage Foreclosure Problem (1937) 23 A. B.
A. J. 41, 47.
92. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 9, § 101; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. (I935) § 9467.
93. CAL. Cirv. CODE (Deering, 1931) §2911; MICH. Com1P. LAws (1929) § 13976; N. C.
CODE ANN. (935) § 437; Bondy v. Percival, 99 N. J. L. 309, 123 Atl. 873 (1924).
94. Lord v. Morris, i8 Cal. 482 (I86I) ; Fitzgerald v. Flanagan, 155 Iowa 217, 135 N.
W. 738 (1912) ; Allen v. Shepherd, 162 Ky. 756, 173 S. W. 135 (915).
95. Scott v. Scott, 20 Ala. 244, 8o So. 82 (1918) ; Bur v. Bong, 159 Wis. 498, I5o N. W.
431 (1915).
96. § 5oa.
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years and a similar extension may also be made by an agreement between mort-
gagor and mortgagee.97 By section 5oe the running of the statute of limitations
is tolled by publication of a notice of foreclosure sale or by commencing an action
to foreclose, and the action or proceeding to foreclose may be completed notwith-
standing the period of limitations has, in fact, run. In this latter instance, the
1927 act made the sale void as against a person who, in good faith, became a pur-
chaser or encumbrancer of the premises between the lapse of the limitations period
and the foreclosure sale.98 The purpose of the statute is to outlaw the mortgage
as a cloud on title so that if the mortgage appears to be invalid by the record it
may not be saved by facts not appearing thereon. The provision of the old act
seems to approach more nearly this end than that of the new.
The 1927 act differs from the new in another important respect in that under
it the statute of limitations was made retroactive,9 9 thus raising a possible consti-
tutional question.100 The new act includes no retroactive provision with respect
to section 50, although the authors of the act evidently intended it to have such
an effect.10 ' Clarification on this point would be desirable in removing a possible
subject of future litigation.102
Conclusion
It was said of the 1927 act:
"The proposed act not only makes for uniformity; it promotes brevity
and certainty in mortgage instruments, simplicity of procedure, and validity
of title. It enables the mortgagee to realize readily on his security; yet it
protects the mortgagor against forfeiture. It relieves court congestion and
shortens registry records." 108
The new act accomplishes these same ends, but to a greater degree. It
insures a greater validity of title; it enables the mortgagee to realize more quickly
on his security; it preserves a simple and cheap method of foreclosure by power
of sale; and yet, at the same time, it affords more substantial protection to the
mortgagor and represents a more practical compromise of the interests of the
mortgagor and mortgagee. But because of the diversity of the law in the states
and their natural unwillingness to slough off old habits and because of present
tendencies to suspend the mortgagee's normal rights,-0 4 the new act may suffer
the same fate as its predecessor in spite of its many advantages. Yet, several
,factors constrain a belief that it will meet with favorable response. First, now
more than ever before, the problems surrounding mortgage loans and foreclosures
have become problems of public concern. The depression has brought about a
general collapse in our credit structure and land values, as a source of credit, have
suffered in particular. In addition, costs and delay in foreclosure, uncertainty of
procedure and security, together with various other factors, have made it almost
impossible to secure loans on property except in amounts far below the value of
the property and then only at high rates of interest. Thus for the rehabilitation
of our credit structure, uniformity of the type provided by the act is dearly
desirable. Secondly, the depression has witnessed the birth and growth of gov-
97. § 5ob and c.
98. 1927 proposal, § 12 (3).
99. Id., § 42.
ioo. Frank v. State Bank & Trust Co., 263 S. W. 255 (Tex. 1924) ; LeSage v. Switzer,
ii6 W. Va. 657, 182 S. E. 797 (1935).
ioi. See outline material of Article II on page i of the act.
102. The remaining provisions of the act do not warrant discussion. § 5I covers crim-
inal offenses. Article VII deals with the interpretation and effect of the act.
I03. See Legis. (1925) 38 IIARv. L. REv. 651, 66o.
io4. See Legis. (i938) 86 U. oF PA. L. RFv. 295.
